"There are no good options."  It's impossible to listen to a debate about what to do in Syria without eventually hearing those five words.  Whether from a liberal or a conservative, someone pro or con on using military force, politician or pundit--that sentence is bound to be uttered.  Some choices are clearly not options: any that would endanger American troops and/or suggest a prolonged involvement (e.g., boots on the ground, a no-fly zone).

For twenty years, discussions of military action were haunted by the 'quagmire' of Vietnam.  Now, though Vietnam still is there in the background, it's the ghost of Iraq that shadows the debate, particularly among those who, in light of the lies by Powell and Cheney, are unwilling to accept the evidence that the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical weapons.  This morning I heard a passionate argument that it was the Chinese and the Russians still in Syria who were responsible for the chemical attacks on behalf of the rebels.  Since Russia and China are supporting the Assad regime, this seemed a strange and unconvincing argument, but the speaker claimed to have evidence to support her point.  Amy Goodman, a progressive, argued that it doesn't make any difference because the U.S. used chemical weapons (napalm, agent orange) in Vietnam and supported Saddam Hussein, who was using gas against the Kurds, during the long Iran-Iraq war.  Therefore, it's hypocritical for us to draw a red line against chemical weapons, and we're prohibited from acting now.

There's also the complication arising from the question as to whether the death of 1,429 Syrians from chemical weapons is somehow more morally reprehensible than the deaths of 100,000 people and the displacement of more than a million more from conventional arms.

Also shadowing the debate is the question, echoing what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, of what is the end game.  What will be the effect of limited, targeted strikes?  On the positive side, there are the examples of Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where such strikes (78 days for Bosnia) were effective and the negative example of Rwanda, where our refusal to intervene is now regarded as a shameful episode in the Clinton presidency.  Two days of strikes might punish Assad (is that a legitimate goal?), but they probably aren't going to change things on the ground.

There are, of course, those like Sen. John ("I never saw a nail I didn't want to hammer") McCain who want more aggressive action.  He would bomb the airstrips in Syria in order to disrupt the daily supplies of arms to the government from Russia and China.  He would also arm the rebels, specifically the Free Syrian Army.  Convinced that we can separate the "good" rebels from the "bad" ones, he wants to send arms to the good rebels.  He's perfectly assured that, since he's been to Syria and talked to representatives of the FSA, the arms won't fall into the wrong hands.  His assurance that we can easily tell the difference and control the flow might be more convincing had the photo of him in Syria showed him standing with members of the FSA and a leader of one of most vicious of the rebel groups.  His office later issued a statement in his defense saying that he didn't know who the man was.  So much for easily distinguishing among the rebel groups.

A year and a half ago, even a year ago, it was common wisdom that Bashar Al-Assad's days were numbered; it was considered self-evident that his regime would collapse.  Now, Assad is stronger than before and the rebels more disorganized and divided.  So we bomb some strategic facilities for two days.  Assad is still in power.  Does our show of force intimidate him into being more flexible in the on-again, off-again diplomatic process?  Or does it just embolden him as one who has taken what the Americans have to offer and is as strong as ever?  Obama is gambling, we assume, that in addition to making a statement about the use of chemical weapons, strikes will facilitate further diplomatic efforts.

President Obama's surprise decision on Saturday to seek Congressional approval has some obvious advantages: it may consolidate support among those, usually progressives, who might tend to support the strikes but who were troubled by yet another presidential usurpation of Congressional power.  Moreover, it puts each member of Congress on the record.  And it may help convince a skeptical American public that air strikes are a good idea--or at least that their representatives have debated the issue and come to that conclusion.  The danger, of course, is that what happened to David Cameron in the U.K. might happen here.  What is Congress refuses to authorize the action?  President Obama has made clear that he doesn't think he needs Congressional authorization.  If they vote no, will he good ahead?  If so, his actions will garner even less support within America.  If not, all the leverage of our threats will be lost.

These are just a few of the thoughts buzzing around in my head the last few days.  I've not even mentioned the sectarian divisions within the country or the proxy position of Syria in conflicts between the West and the East or within the Muslim communities.  There's a good reason, many good reasons, why there are no good options in Syria.